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Procurement is much used by public administrations (firms and international institutions) to 
buy goods with specific characteristics. Currently, public procurement in the EU is estimated 
to account for about 14% of GDP.1 Despite the extent to which procurement is used in the 
public sector, relatively few studies (prominent among which are Domberger et al. 1986, 
Snyder et al. 2001, and Decarolis 2014) have attempted to provide econometric evidence on 
the extent and sources of cost savings (namely the reduction in the amount paid by the 
government to procure the good) in competitive tendering. 
This study is motivated by several interesting features of both the original data set on 
service procurements conducted by the Spanish Armed Forces (SAF) that we have compiled 
and the econometric methodology that we have employed, which lead us to believe that 
significant efficiency and managerial lessons can be learned from its results. For one thing, 
our measure of savings includes only savings derived from competition between bidders. By 
contrast, savings measures derived from privatization competitions of the kind encouraged by 
the U.S. Commercial Activities program by definition combine savings from competition and 
savings from privatization (see, e.g., Carrick 1988 and Snyder et al. 2001). As such, the 
lessons derived from the results obtained in this paper are therefore better suited to situations 
in which the service to be procured is not being provided in-house. 
Second, we estimate a savings regression model on a relatively rich set of 
characteristics of procurements, including the estimated cost of the service, the weight given 
to price in the contract award criteria, and, for a subsample of procurements, information on 
the number of bidders who participated in the tender. To the best of our knowledge we are the 






about by) introducing dimensions other than price into the award criteria, which is the 
distinctive feature of the EU’s most economically advantageous tender contract award system. 
Last but not least, we precisely estimate a flexible nonlinear regression model of savings 
which is then tested against a variety of specification failures. 
On the other hand, this paper suffers from some limitations which need to be taken 
into account when drawing policy conclusions from its results. Prominent among them is the 
fact that the econometric model that we estimate does not include information on contractors’ 
actual performance but rather some controls for ex-ante quality of service (Domberger et al. 
1995) plus a measure of bid screening intensity by the contract awarding committee 
(Decarolis 2014). To the extent that these controls are, as a matter of fact, insufficient to 
account for the risk of poor performance by contractors, our estimates would tend to overstate 
the magnitude of, and the effects on, true savings (note, however, that the evidence on the 
effect of competition on performance is somewhat mixed: See the references below.) 
Furthermore, the paper focuses on estimating the net effect of covariates on savings, 
which precludes forecasting the effects of regime shifts that are not reflected in the data. For 
example, from our results one cannot predict the impact on savings of a change in certain 
competition rules (e.g. an increase in the financial guarantee to be given by the contractor), or 
a change in market structure that goes beyond a variation in the number of actual competitors. 
Nevertheless, for the reasons given above, we think that we provide robust and precise further 
evidence on economically advantageous determinants of savings, some of which are 
amenable to policy change. 
In the field of Defense, due partly to the scarcity of adequate data (MacDonald 2010), 
nearly all of the few studies that have attempted to measure the extent and sources of cost 
savings associated with competitive tendering analyze U.S. Department of Defense data and 




Domberger et al. 2002, and Lyon 2006).2 We are aware of only one other Defense-specific 
study of cost savings, conducted in Spain (Fernández Roca 2011). The author of this last 
study reports a relatively small savings rate (4%) in contracting out the maintenance of 
helicopters used by the SAF, but this figure did not result from competitive bidding but from 
more centralized procurement. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on public 
procurement in Spain during the period covered by this analysis. Section 3 reviews the data 
and the construction of the main variables. Section 4 describes the estimation framework and 
Section 5 presents the econometric results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN SPAIN UNDER THE 2011 LAW 
From December 16, 2011 to approximately the first half of 2017, procurement by the Spanish 
government (including the armed forces) took place under Royal Legislative Decree 2011/3. 
During the lifetime of this law, and after receiving authorization to procure, the procurement 
process began with a contracting agency estimating the contracting dossier value. This was 
calculated as the estimated cost of the service (work or supply) to be procured net of VAT 
plus the cost of possible options and renewals and possible bonuses paid to bidders. The cost 
estimated by the agency was intended to reflect the general market price of the service, and 
indicated to the interested providers the maximum acceptable price for the agency (excluding 
options, renewals, and bonuses). The estimated cost is often called the reserve price in the 
literature (e.g., see Dimitri et al. 2006). 
                                                            




Whenever a contracting dossier for a service was valued at €18,000 or more, it had to 
be purchased ordinarily by a procurement process open to any interested provider.3 The 
winning bidder was determined by means of a sealed-bid auction in which one of two 
different award criteria could be employed: lowest cost or most economically advantageous 
tender (MEAT). The former criterion implied that the contract would be awarded to the 
lowest bidder provided the bid was no higher than the cost estimate. MEAT was used 
whenever the procurement involved dimensions in addition to price. 
The use of MEAT implied that each individual dimension of a quote would be 
evaluated and assigned a score, and the contract would be awarded to the supplier who 
submitted the quote with the highest score according to a pre-specified scoring rule. For 
example, in a procurement for the maintenance of a military base’s water supply system, the 
score assigned to bidder j’s quote was calculated as 








  , jResponse  took the value 5 (10) if j’s offered time to restore 
water supply in case of a breakdown was 1 hour (2 hours) less than the maximum permitted 
time, and jStandard  equaled 10 if j certified ISO 9001 standard quality management. In both 
lowest cost and MEAT systems a tie was broken by randomizing equally over the bidders 
with the best bid. 
In cases where it was possible to provide the service to be procured separately but it 
still constituted a functional unit (e.g. the maintenance of buildings located at different 
military bases), the whole contracting dossier could be divided into batches. Providing that 
                                                            
3 When the contracting dossier value was difficult to pinpoint, there was overriding urgency, 
or a contract had previously been declared void, among other circumstances, the purchase 




the whole dossier was valued €18,000 or more, each batch had to be purchased ordinarily by 
procurement of the types described above (even if the cost estimate for a batch was lower than 
€18,000). 
Several provisions were included in the 2011 law which were aimed at eliciting 
unbiased bids and limiting the risk of poor performance by contractors. One of those 
provisions was the possibility of requiring the winning bidder to prove the price that it offered 
if that price was judged to be abnormally low by the contract awarding committee. In the 
event that its explanations were deemed unreliable, the winning bidder would be disqualified 
and (typically) the second lowest bidder would win. 
The bid-envelopes received were opened and examined at a public event. The awardee 
could be awarded a contract for at most 4 years, although contracts for services were typically 
of much shorter duration. With some exceptions (e.g. when security or public safety could be 
jeopardized) the identity and bid of the winning bidder were published in the contract results 
notice. 
Cost savings occurred whenever the winning bid was lower than the cost estimate. In 
principle, these savings represent an efficiency gain from competitive source selection which 
can be ascribed, ultimately, to the decrease in production costs brought about by competitive 
pressure between producers (Leibenstein 1966).4 
In the case of the SAF, these savings cannot be properly viewed as deriving from 
outsourcing, as they did not stem from the substitution of in-house production by more 
efficient, contracted-out provision. As pointed out by Fernández Roca (2011), the purchasing 
of support services spread as a consequence of the reduction in the number of recruits that 
                                                            
4 In the words of Carrick (1988), since competition stimulates the quest for better production 





followed the abolition of compulsory military service on January 1, 2002. Coinciding with 
this reduction in personnel the SAF budget for procuring commercial services grew from 
€47.9 million in 1997 to €121.0 million in 2002, and to €137.4 million in 2015 (all figures 
expressed in 2015 euros), accounting respectively for 0.61, 1.48, and 2.38% of the Spanish 
Ministry of Defense budget. 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
We analyze 515 procurements of services pertaining to 256 contracting dossiers undertaken 
by the SAF in the period 2012-2015. Specifically, the contract notices for these dossiers were 
published between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2015, and procurements were awarded 
before June 1, 2016. This limit on the awarding date excluded very few of the procurement 
procedures started in the last months of 2015, as 90% of the procurements are awarded within 
143 days. 
The 256 contracting dossiers included in this study represent 47.2% of the 542 service 
contracting dossiers awarded through competitive bidding by the SAF in the period 2012-
2015. The rest of the dossiers were discarded for several reasons: In 226 cases cost savings 
were not possible, either because the cost estimate represented a commitment of funds to be 
used to pay the contractor’s invoices or to subsidize the price of a service, or because the 
dossiers involved special administrative contracts, which entail no cost for the government 
since the price of the service is paid for by the end user. A further 14 dossiers were dropped 
on the grounds that they were canceled before awarding, 31 for having incomplete or 
inconsistent data (including the cap on the savings rate explained below), and 15 because their 
procurements were declared void. Table 1 presents a frequency distribution of contracting 
dossiers by type, sample selection status, and year. 
The data on the sample of procurements was compiled expressly for this study from 




is the national advertising website for Spanish government agencies to post contract notices, 
legal and technical tender information sheets, and contract results. These documents were 
personally read by the first author, and the information obtained was stored as a set of 
variables whose definition is outlined below; a more detailed definition plus some descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 2. 
The explaining variable is “Savings from a procurement”. Following Snyder et al. 
(2001), savings are calculated as the difference between the cost estimate and the winning bid 
(both inclusive of VAT) divided by the contract term measured in years. 
We have removed from the sample those procurements whose savings rate (i.e. 
savings divided by the cost estimate also expressed on an annual basis) was above the 95th 
percentile of the savings rate distribution. Very high savings rates are likely to be the result of 
mismeasuring the general market price of the service, which introduces measurement error 
into the explaining variable as well as into an explanatory variable. It is not obvious a priori in 
which direction the reserve price could be mismeasured. Contracting agencies may have an 
incentive to overestimate the reserve price to reduce the probability that the contract be 
declared void. (In this case, the cost estimate would be capped by the agency’s option of 
entering a negotiation with well-known, but not very efficient, potential providers.) But by the 
“exclusion principle” (Albano et al. 2006), an agency pursuing the minimization of the 
awarding price may find it in her interest to set a low reserve price. Thus, any supplier 
efficient enough to be able to submit an acceptable offer knows that his competitors will 
belong to a pool of efficient participants, so that submitted offers will be more aggressive than 
in the presence of a higher reserve price. 
In the surviving set of 515 procurements, savings on an annual basis totaled €24.6 
million and averaged €47,829. Figure 1 shows the empirical savings distribution. Expressed 




As a measure of the extent of bid rigging in SAF’s service contracting, we calculated 
the percentage of procurements where the winning bid was within 1% of the cost estimate. 
This “collusive marker” (Harrington 2008) derives from McAfee and McMillan’s (1992) 
analysis of bidding behavior at first-price sealed-bid auctions. While low savings are of 
course consistent with interdependent though unilateral conduct (e.g. see Marshall and Marx 
2012, p. 13), they suggest instances where competition between providers may be low. The 
resulting figure was 12.4%, which is about half the percentage found in settings where 
collusion was found to be common (cf. McAfee and McMillan 1992). Furthermore, the figure 
was much lower (5.2%) among the 135 procurements awarded using the lowest cost criterion. 
The explanatory variables for savings can be classified as characteristics of the 
procurement, of the contracting agency, and of the service. The characteristics of the 
procurement are represented by a quadratic function of the natural logarithm of the cost 
estimate (also expressed on an annual basis for consistency with the explaining variable),5 the 
percentage weight given to price in the award criteria (which is the essential difference 
between the lowest cost and MEAT systems), a variable indicating urgent procurements, a 
measure of bid screening intensity by the contract awarding committee, an indicator for 
whether the contract allows for extra payments, and the procurement’s vintage as measured 
by year dummies. The characteristic of the contracting agency is the number of sample 
procurements conducted. The characteristics of the service are captured broadly by service-
type fixed effects. 
There are a number of reasons to adopt these factors as explanatory variables. First, 
Snyder et al. (2001) find that savings (i) rise more than proportionally to function size; (ii) 
vary across service types; and (iii) do not diminish as time passes. Second, when procurement 
                                                            
5 As in the paper by Snyder et al. (2001), the fit in the savings regression was much better 




is deemed urgent the period for sending bids is reduced from 15 days to just 8 days, which 
might induce the participation of fewer bidders and/or less intense bidding between 
participants, resulting in higher winning bids and lower savings. Third, larger, busier agencies 
may have an incentive to overestimate the cost estimate so as so reduce the probability that 
the contracts be declared void, a practice which would reduce savings if the exclusion 
principle holds in reverse. 
Goldberg (1977) and Spulber (1990) argue the existence of a trade-off between price 
and quality in first-price auctions. Although the empirical evidence on this issue is not 
conclusive (e.g. see Domberger et al. 1995, Cameron 2000, and Decarolis 2014), it is 
conceivable that an increase in the time taken to award the contract by the awarding 
committee comes with the benefit of selecting a more reliable contractor, but also at the 
expense of reducing savings (Decarolis 2014). In the same vein, cost overruns were generally 
not allowed by the 2011 law, but when the contract term exceeded one year the award price 
could be increased for reasons stated in the contract itself. In these cases, as suggested by 
Goldberg (1977), the broader prospect of extra payments after the contract was awarded 
might induce more aggressive bidding at the time of contracting and therefore higher savings. 
For a subsample of 368 procurements, the information stored in PLACE includes the 
number of bidders (n). Thus, when fitting the econometric model into this subsample, a 
quadratic function of n is also included among the explanatory variables. The quadratic 
specification allows the possibility of a varying empirical effect of n on savings. As explained 
in Pinkse and Tan (2005), in conditionally independent private-value (CIPV) first-price 
auctions, an increase in n could lead to less aggressive bidding if bidders internalize the 
“affiliation effect”, namely that the distribution of rivals' production costs has more mass at 




larger the more aggressive bidding induced by the presence of more rivals (the “competition 
effect”) eventually dominates and the bid function is again decreasing in n. 
When fitting the econometric model in the subsample, no special estimation technique 
is used: The fact that the savings variable itself appears to be irrelevant in a probit model for 
the observability of n,6 plus the fact that the average number of bidders (3.0) closely 
resembles that observed in other samples of government service procurements (e.g. see Li and 
Zheng 2009) leads us to believe that the information on n is missed exogenously. 
4. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Our empirical strategy is to specify, estimate, and test a regression model of savings (denoted 
by y ) on the set of explanatory variables ( x ). We do not analyze the cancellation/completion 
outcome of a procurement due to the small number of canceled procurements in our sample. 
Nor do we allow separate mechanisms to determine whether 0y   or 0y   and the 
magnitude of y  whenever 0y   due to the small number of cases with 0y   in our data 
(only 21 procurements present zero savings). 
We assume that the conditional expectation of y  given x  follows the Box-Cox like 
model proposed by Wooldridge (1992): 
    11 , 0E y    x xβ  (2.1) 
  exp , 0 xβ , (2.2) 
with  21, , , Kx xx  , where the inequality 1 0 xβ  (with strict inequality for 0  ) 
must hold for all relevant values of x . This model is attractive in that it ensures positivity for 
any value of x  and any parameter values β  and  . Furthermore, it nests popular alternatives 
                                                            
6 The probit estimation included the above-mentioned explanatory variables as additional 
regressors, and its R-squared, calculated as one minus the ratio of the log likelihood of the 




for analyzing nonnegative explaining variables, such as exponential ( 0  ) and linear ( 1 
) regressions, so it provides a unified framework for testing particular, simpler functional 
forms. 
On the other hand, it is well-known that the t-statistics for the estimated slope 
coefficients 2ˆ ˆ, , K   are not invariant to the scaling of y  whenever   is estimated along 
with β . The solution to this problem proposed by Wooldridge (1992) assumes  0 1P y   , 
which does not hold in this study. But since the estimate of   plus its standard error is 
invariant to the scaling of y , we applied the following procedure to estimate (2): Firstly, we 
estimated jointly β  and   to obtain an idea of the population value of  . Then we estimated 
restricted versions of (2) in which the value of   was set to be equal to a subset of values 
taken from the confidence interval of ̂ , using Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) to select among these restricted models.7 (Previewing the results, the model 
with the lowest BIC has 0  .) 
Estimations were conducted using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) in the 
linear exponential family (LEF) of probability distributions. In comparison with MLEs such 
as Tobit, QMLEs in the LEF are attractive in that they are robust to distributional 
misspecifications other than the conditional mean (Gourieroux et al. 1984). In our samples, 
indeed, conditional moment tests conducted after Tobit estimation (Pagan and Vella 1989) 
detected departures of the errors from normality and homoskedasticity (p-values < .01).8 
                                                            
7 BIC is preferred to other popular information criteria when some modeling alternatives are 
nested (Nishii 1988). Granger et al. (1995) provide a critical assessment of model selection 
procedures based upon information criteria. 
8 As recommended by Drukker (2002) and Wilhelm (2008), the sampling distributions of the 




Weighted linear/nonlinear least squares estimators can also be consistent under less than full 
distributional assumptions and asymptotically as efficient as QMLEs, but they rely on two-
step estimation and are, hence, computationally more burdensome. Symmetrically censored 
least squares and censored least absolute deviations are useful whenever y  is truly censored, 
but less so when interest lies in estimating properties of  E y x . 
The particular QMLE utilized in this study is the exponential QMLE. Wooldridge (1992) 
provides formulae for the joint exponential QMLE of β  and  . Here, we focus on the 
exponential QMLE of β  given  . Most of the following formulae are simple adaptations of 
those derived by Wooldridge (1992). 
Let  , ;im x β  represent the conditional mean function (2) for procurement i , 
1, ,i N  , with   set to a given value. β̂  is obtained by maximizing 
      , ; ln , ;i i i iy m m      β x β x β . (3) 
Under correct specification of  , ;im x β  plus standard regularity conditions (see Gourieroux 
et al. 1984), β̂  is consistent and asymptotically normal. 
Additionally, the exponential QMLE implicitly assumes a nonconstant conditional 
variance of y , 
     2var , ;y m    x x β , (4) 
which can result in efficiency gains with respect to ordinary linear/nonlinear least squares. 




(Wooldridge 2010, p. 741), our inference is robust to violations of (4): The estimated variance 
matrix of β̂  is calculated as9 
      1 1ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆV 1N N   β A BA , (5) 
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        2, ; , ; , ;i i i i i im y m m                  s β β x β β x β x β , and 
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       x β β xβ x  (6.1) 




ii β  was maximized in Stata (Version 11) using the command ml and providing 
the optimization routine analytical first and expected second derivatives of the objective 
function (as in Mantel and Myers 1971). The QML estimates were obtained using the 
Newton-Raphson algorithm in conjunction with the starting values recommended by Mantel 
and Myers (1971). Convergence was accepted when both the scaled gradient and the relative 
change in the coefficient vector from one iteration to the next were less than 10−8. When   
was estimated along with β , maximization proceeded in a similar fashion except that the 
optimization routine used numerical first and second derivatives of the objective function. 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The joint exponential QMLE of β  and   run on the full sample yielded ˆ .118  , robust 
. . .089S E  , with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of -.056 to .292. In the subsample, ˆ .108  , 
                                                            
9 Wooldridge (2010) calls (5) a semirobust variance matrix estimator, as it assumes correct 




robust . . .176S E  , implying a 95% CI of -.237 to .453. Setting the value of   to be equal to 
each value in the set  0.2, 0.1, 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4  , which summarizes the widest of the 
above-mentioned CIs, we maximized  
1
N
ii β  by the method explained in the previous 
section. Table 3 presents the BIC values achieved by the restricted models. In both the full 
sample and the subsample the exponential regression model ( 0  ) was the best data-fitting 
option, with BIC values increasing monotonically as   deviated from 0. 
5.1 Beta Coefficients 
The exponential regression estimates of β  are given in Table 4. Column (1) presents the 
estimates obtained in the full sample, whereas columns (2) and (3) show, respectively, the 
estimates obtained in the subsample first excluding and then including the quadratic function 
of n in order to assess the impact of including in x  n. At the bottom of each column the p-
value of the robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for 0   developed in Wooldridge (1992) 
is shown. This test assesses the validity of the exponential regression form against the more 
general function (2). In all three cases, the exponential form is not questioned at standard 
significance levels, although the non-rejection of 0   is held with more confidence when x  
includes information on n. 
The three sets of estimates of β  presented in Table 4 tell a rather consistent story in 
terms of sign and statistical significance. At the 5% level the cost estimate, the weight given 
to price in the award criteria, and the number of weeks taken to announce the identity of the 
winning bidder all have positive effects on savings. The positive effect of weeks taken to 
award is not consistent with the hypothesis laid out in Section 3. However, this effect should 
not be interpreted causally but rather as reflecting that screening takes longer when the agency 




being abnormally low,10 higher savings result from procurements that take longer to award. 
Since there might be unobserved factors simultaneously affecting the level of savings and the 
screening intensity (e.g. mismeasurement of the general market price of the service), we 
tested for endogeneity of the weeks to award variable. To that end, we included in x  the 
residual from a linear regression of weeks to award on the other explanatory variables plus the 
square of the weight given to price, as it turns out that the effect of the weight of price on 
weeks to award is U-shaped. We then tested the statistical significance of the residual term 
using a robust Wald test (Wooldridge 2010, p. 742). In all three cases shown in Table 4, the 
residual was statistically insignificant (the test p-value ranged from .23 to .53). 
At the 5% level, the number of procurements conducted by the contracting agency and 
the variable indicating procurement for hotel/restaurant services exert negative effects on 
savings. With other factors held unchanged, procurements conducted by larger agencies 
generate lower savings on average, possibly because larger agencies tend to overestimate the 
general market prices of services in their cost estimates and this induces less intense bidding 
between participants.11 Savings in procurements for hotel/restaurant services are, as a rule, 
lower than savings in procurements for maintenance or other personal services. To the extent 
                                                            
10 A total of 96 awarding committee meeting minutes (pertaining to the same number of 
procurements) were published in PLACE. The 13 among them which contain a request to 
justify prices took, on average, 10.1 weeks to award, whereas the other 83 took 5.9 weeks. 
Only in 3 cases was the winning bidder disqualified, which generated an 11% reduction in 
savings on average. 
11 A linear regression of the natural logarithm of the winning bid on the explanatory variables 
for savings revealed that having conducted five additional procurements is associated with a 




that the output of hotel/restaurant services is harder to quantify, these results seem to conform 
to the pattern observed by Snyder et al. (2001). 
The binary variables indicating urgent procurements, contracts that allow for extra 
payments, and the year of the contract notice have no significant effects on savings, in the last 
two cases mainly because their effects are measured imprecisely. We find the lack of effect on 
savings of the urgent indicator particularly noteworthy even before accounting for differences 
in the number of bidders, which seems to indicate that bidders search effectively for bid 
submission opportunities. 
The number of bidders has a quadratic effect on savings that gives rise to an inverted U-
shaped relationship between n and savings. On average, savings increase with n until the 
procurement involves 16 bidders, and decrease from there on. But only two procurements 
included in the subsample involved more than 16 bidders, so savings are actually increasing 
with n for almost all of the observed range of this variable (although at a decreasing rate). 
This result suggests that restricting the number of bidders will not generally benefit the 
government because it will generally reduce savings. In line with this conclusion, the new 
Spanish public procurement law, which is a transposition of the EU procurement directives 
2014/23/UE, 2014/24/UE, and 2014/25/UE, seeks to stimulate formally advertised 
procurement in lieu of negotiated procurement. 
Nevertheless, we must admit that n might be underestimating the size of the relevant 
market, as n may be influenced by participation decisions. The direction of the possible bias, 
however, cannot be established a priori. Consider, for example, the level of the cost estimate, 
which may determine both the level of participation and the characteristics of the participating 
providers. Setting a relatively low cost estimate reduces the numerical participation, 




may be very aggressive if the exclusion principle holds. In any case, including or excluding in 
x n hardly changes the other estimated coefficients. 
5.2 Average Marginal Effects 
Table 5 presents average marginal effects (AMEs) calculated from the exponential regression 
estimates of β . Letting  kx  and  kβ  denote the vectors x  and β  with the thk  explanatory 
variable removed, the marginal effect of kx  on  E y x  is given by 
            exp + expkk k k kE y   x x β x β  (7) 
when kx  is binary, and 
 









xβ  (8) 
when kx  is continuous. For quadratic functions of kx , the marginal effect is given by 
 










xβ , (9) 
where 1k   is the coefficient associated with 
2
kx . AMEs are estimated by plugging β̂  into 
these expressions and then averaging across observations, with standard errors calculated 
using the delta method. For the two sets of binary variables representing year and service-type 
fixed effects, AMEs are calculated by zeroing out all of the dummies in the set and then 
setting the corresponding kx  to 1 for all observations. 
Savings (on an annual basis) are estimated to grow on average by €1,800-€1,900 when 
the cost estimate increases by €10,000. This effect is very precisely measured and attains 
statistical significance at the 1% level. The implied elasticity of savings with respect to the 
cost estimate (i.e. the elasticity with respect to the size of the procured function), calculated as 
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is essentially the same across specifications: 1.00 (S.E. = .03) in the full sample, 1.01 (S.E. = 
.03) in the subsample excluding the quadratic function of n, and .99 (S.E. = .03) when the 
quadratic function of n is included. Thus, with other factors being unchanged, a 1% variation 
in the size of the function leads approximately to a 1% variation in savings, so that savings 
vary almost proportionally to size. A size elasticity of savings of 1 indicates that the practice 
of contracting agencies of dividing contracting dossiers into batches is irrelevant from the 
point of view of the total amount of savings attained. Moreover, it does not provide support 
for the opposite practice of centralizing the contracting out of services. This is a conclusion 
that the small savings rate achieved by centralizing the maintenance of helicopters used by the 
SAF already seemed to suggest. 
For A-76 competitions, Snyder et al. (2001) estimate size elasticities of savings greater 
than unity, with size measured as the number of either civilian or military personnel employed 
in the function. They report that a 1% variation in civilian personnel leads approximately to a 
1.08% variation in savings (S.E. = .04), whereas the elasticity is 1.43% (S.E. = .10) with 
respect to variations in military personnel. Not surprisingly, our size elasticity of savings is 
smaller because it measures the response of savings to competition between bidders only, 
whereas the elasticities in Snyder et al. combine in their response variations in savings due to 
both competition and privatization. As such, the managerial lessons derived from our 
estimated response are better suited to the acquisition of functions that are not being provided 
in-house. 
With other factors remaining unchanged, an increase of 10 percentage points in the 
weight given to price in the award criteria would increase savings in the neighborhood of 
€5,600 to €7,700. These estimates are quite precisely measured and attain statistical 
significance at the 1% level. Interpreted from the point of view of reducing the importance 




for the reduction in savings brought about by) introducing dimensions other than price in the 
award criteria. For example, as a consequence of introducing the Response and Standard 
dimensions in the weighing function in expression (1), savings seem to have decreased by 
between €16,800 and €23,100 ceteris paribus, which corresponds to a 30 percentage point 
reduction in the weight given to price in the award criteria. The reason why the government 
may be willing to give up these savings may have to do with the reduction in the risk of poor 
performance that these additional dimensions may provide above and beyond the reduction 
permitted by other measures stipulated in the law. 
The AME of the weight given to price diminishes somewhat after accounting for 
differences in the number of bidders across procurements. We used the Hausman test 
(Hausman 1978) to determine whether the two estimators of the marginal effect of the weight 
for price run on the subsample have different probability limits, and conclude that the null 
hypothesis of equal probability limits cannot be rejected at standard significance levels (p-
value .21).12 
Procurements for hotel/restaurant services generate substantially smaller savings than 
comparable procurements for maintenance, with the reduction ranging from €21,900 to 
€32,500 depending on the specification. Hausman test results marginally question whether the 
two estimators for the marginal effect of the hotel/restaurant indicator run on the subsample 
have equal probability limits (p-value .06), which suggests that a fraction (to be more precise, 
about one third) of the reduction in savings is due to the lower number of bidders who 
participate on average in procurements for hotel/restaurant services. 
The AME on savings of an additional bidder is €8,900. This effect is measured quite 
precisely and attains statistical significance at the 1% level. Figure 2 shows the marginal 
                                                            
12 The variance of the difference between the two estimators was estimated using the paired 




effect on savings of an additional bidder calculated (with the finite-different method of 
expression (7)) at different values of the distribution of n, as well as error bars of twice the 
estimated robust standard error. The marginal effect on savings of an additional bidder is 
positive over the whole range shown, although the increase in the effect becomes successively 
smaller and indeed negative once 6 bidders are involved. In procurements involving three 
bidders (which is the minimum number of potential providers to be contacted in negotiated 
procurement), the evidence suggests that the presence of an additional bidder would increase 
savings by about €10,100, with a 95% CI of approximately €6,800 to €13,300. 
5.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
The negative association between the size of the contracting agency and savings might be the 
result of larger agencies overestimating the general market price of the service to be procured. 
But if this is so, the elasticity of savings with respect to the cost estimate could be biased. To 
assess the scope of this possible source of bias, we re-estimated the models in Table 4 with 
the log of the cost estimate and the square of that estimate interacted with the size of the 
agency (SIZE for brevity). In all three cases, the interaction terms  ln cost estimate *SIZE  
and   2ln cost estimate *SIZE  were jointly statistically insignificant, with the test’s p-value 
ranging from .70 in the full sample, to .13 in the subsample excluding the quadratic function 
of n, to .37 including the quadratic function of n. Consequently, the elasticity of savings with 
respect to the cost estimate, calculated now as 
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x , (11) 
hardly changes: see column (2) of Table 6. 
More generally, one might wonder whether the quadratic functions of (the log of) the cost 




variables such as the weight given to price, the screening intensity, and the size of the 
contracting agency were simply entered linearly in x . To detect possible functional form 
misspecification in x  we applied the extension of Ramsey’s (1969) regression specification 
error test (RESET) to the exponential context described in Wooldridge (2010, p. 427). Thus, 
we added  2ˆxβ  and  3ˆxβ  to x  and then tested their joint statistical significance with a 
heteroskedasticity-robust Wald statistic, which, under the assumption of no functional form 
misspecification, is asymptotically distributed as 22 . Each column of Table 4 presents the p-
value for this test. In all cases, the claim of no functional form misspecification is well within 
confidence bounds. 
The quantity of information stored in PLACE generally increases over the years. Thus, 
for example, it is more likely to find information on n for a procurement published in the 
period 2014-2015 than in 2012-2013. We wondered whether the same tendency might apply 
regarding the quality of the information available in PLACE. Hence, we re-estimated the 
models using the subsample of procurements published between January 1, 2014 and 
December 31, 2015. Table 7 presents the exponential regression AMEs calculated for these 
two years.13 The negative effect on savings of procurement for hotel/restaurant services 
becomes smaller and statistically insignificant, whereas the AME of an additional bidder is 
now somewhat larger. Again, however, the elasticity of savings with respect to the cost 
estimate is in the neighborhood of 1: see column (3) of Table 6. 
Column (4) of Table 6 shows that the size elasticity of savings hardly changed after 
excluding the two observations with largest savings which are clearly visible in Figure 1. The 
estimates (not shown) from a logistic regression for savings per euro of cost estimate and a 
                                                            
13 The dummy variable for whether the contract will allow for extra payments is removed 




linear regression for the logarithm of the winning bid are consistent with the claim that cost 
savings are a fixed proportion of the cost estimate. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study provides novel and broad econometric evidence on the extent and determinants of 
cost savings in public procurement. By compiling data on the characteristics of 515 
procurements of support services conducted by the Spanish Armed Forces between 2012 and 
2015, we find that savings averaged out at 17.9% of the cost estimate (or reserve price) for the 
service, which is in line with the international evidence on competitive bidding but is 
substantially higher than the domestic evidence on savings from centralized procurement. 
Furthermore, by estimating a flexible nonlinear regression model of savings on a rich 
set of characteristics of procurements we find that savings rise proportionally to the cost 
estimate. This result concurs with the size elasticity of savings greater than 1 in Snyder et al. 
(2001), as we measured the response of savings to competition among bidders only, whereas 
Snyder et al. developed estimates of the response of savings to variations in both competition 
and privatization. Our estimated size elasticity of 1 conveys important managerial lessons for 
the acquisition of services that are not being provided in-house: It indicates that the practice 
by contracting agencies of breaking up a large project into several smaller contracts is 
irrelevant from the point of view of the total savings attained, as is the opposite practice of 
centralizing the procurement of services. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use actual data to estimate the 
opportunity cost of introducing dimensions in addition to price in the contract award criteria, 
which is the distinctive feature of the EU’s most economically advantageous tender award 
system. Our most reliable estimates suggest that a reduction of 10 percentage points in the 
weight given to price in the award criteria reduces savings by approximately €7,000 (2.3% of 




reduces savings for almost all of the observed range of number of bidders, which supports the 
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TABLE 1—SERVICE CONTRACTING DOSSIERS AWARDED BY THE SPANISH ARMED FORCES 
THROUGH COMPETITIVE BIDDING, BY TYPE OF DOSSIER, SAMPLE SELECTION STATUS, AND 
YEAR 




















2012 33 3 1 3 9 10 57 116 49.1 
2013 51 8 2 1 12 2 59 135 43.7 
2014 51 4 1 2 4 1 70 133 52.6 
2015 55 13 4 8 6 2 70 158 44.3 












Difference between the cost estimate and the winning bid (both inclusive of VAT) divided by 
the contract term, measured in €1000s on an annual basis.  
47.83 (128.10) 54.83 (145.20) 
Cost estimatea Cost estimate divided by the contract term, measured in €10,000s on an annual basis. 29.99 (61.23) 32.73 (64.85) 
Weight for priceb Percentage weight given to price in the award criteria, divided by 10. 7.18 (2.24) 7.46** (2.16) 
Urgentc Dummy variable = 1 if procurement was deemed to be urgent. 0.22 0.17*** 
Screeninga 
Difference (in weeks) between when the bids were opened by the awarding committee and 
when the identity of the winning bidder was announced. 
6.07 (4.79) 6.39 (5.34) 
Price amendb Dummy variable = 1 if the contract price could be altered for reasons stated in the contract. 0.09 0.12 
Year 2012c Dummy variable = 1if the contract notice was published in 2012. 0.22 0.10*** 
Year 2013c Dummy variable = 1if the contract notice was published in 2013. 0.30 0.30 
Year 2014c Dummy variable = 1if the contract notice was published in 2014. 0.24 0.28 
Year 2015c Dummy variable = 1if the contract notice was published in 2015. 0.24 0.32*** 
Size of agencya 
Number of sample auctions managed by the agency which the observed auction belongs to, 
divided by 5. 
6.33 (5.15) 5.57*** (4.47) 
Maintenance of 
vehicles/apparatusesc
Dummy variable = 1 if the contract was for repair or maintenance of vehicles or apparatuses. 0.23 0.24 
Maintenance of 
buildingsc 
Dummy variable = 1 if the contract was for repair or maintenance of building installations. 0.16 0.15 
Hotel/Restaurantc 





Dummy variable =1 if the contract was for transportation, telecommunications, or training 
services. 
0.15 0.14 
Refusec Dummy variable = 1 if the contract was for sewage, refuse, or cleaning services. 0.09 0.07 
Miscellaneousc Dummy variable =1 if the contract was for other services. 0.15 0.15 
No. of biddersd Includes bids above the cost estimate, presenting formal errors, or deemed abnormally low.  3.01 (2.75) 
Source: a: Authors’ calculations based on contract results notice data. b: Tender information legal sheet. c: Contract notice. d: Contract results notice. 
Notes: A Student’s t test was used to check whether a variable’s mean in the subsample was statistically different from the point estimate of the same 






TABLE 3—BIC VALUES 
  Full sample, N = 515  Subsample, N = 368
-0.2 4143.17  3010.29 
-0.1 4136.52  3007.16 
0 4126.45  2999.32 
0.1 4131.17  3004.48 
0.2 4131.99  3005.15 
0.3 4135.67  3007.83 
0.4 4142.48  3011.36 
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TABLE 4—QML ESTIMATES OF SAVINGS. EXPONENTIAL REGRESSION ( 0  ). 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample Subsample Subsample 
Explanatory variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Ln of cost estimate 1.027*** .061 .988*** .076 .842*** .072 
(Ln of cost estimate)2 -.006 .012 .004 .015 .030** .014 
Weight for price (÷ 10) .116*** .021 .138*** .027 .121*** .028 
Urgent -.105 .102 .007 .125 .004 .137 
Screening (weeks) .033*** .008 .034*** .009 .038*** .009 
Price amend .220 .185 .267 .200 .142 .215 
Year 2013 .019 .108 .027 .181 .082 .197 
Year 2014 -.162 .100 -.104 .174 .012 .192 
Year 2015 .042 .106 .093 .162 .214 .175 
Size of agency (procurements ÷ 5) -.026*** .009 -.040*** .012 -.038*** .013 
Maintenance of buildings .011 .092 .102 .112 .087 .115 
Hotel/Restaurant -.768*** .166 -.647*** .196 -.444** .226 
Other personal services .084 .108 .325** .138 .517*** .139 
Refuse -.390*** .143 -.203 .178 -.149 .180 
Miscellaneous services -.278** .117 -.276 .149 -.234 .153 
No. of bidders     .207*** .030 
(No. of bidders)2     -.007*** .002 
Intercept -.170 .209 -.415 .280 -.896*** .322 
      
Log likelihood -2013.27 -1463.02 -1446.49 
LM test of 0   [.15] [.11] [.56] 
Ramsey’s (1969) RESET [.30] [.23] [.79] 
Observations 515 368 368 
Notes: Savings are measured in thousands of euros on an annual basis. Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Figures in brackets are p-values. Unreported categories: Year 2012, 







TABLE 5—QML ESTIMATES OF SAVINGS. EXPONENTIAL REGRESSION ( 0  ). 
AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample Subsample Subsample 
Explanatory variable AME S.E. AME S.E. AME S.E. 
Cost estimate (€10,000s) 1.812*** .078 1.923*** .099 1.894*** .100 
Weight for price (÷ 10) 5.572*** 1.066 7.702*** 1.613 6.689*** 1.675 
Urgent -4.920 4.719 .397 6.987 .238 7.549 
Screening (weeks) 1.576*** .397 1.925*** .520 2.095*** .528 
Price amend 11.483 10.302 16.437 13.393 8.199 12.978
Year 2013 .935 5.336 1.507 10.031 4.281 10.149
Year 2014 -7.291 4.482 -5.425 9.228 .591 9.607 
Year 2015 2.070 5.279 5.359 9.118 11.877 9.381 
Size of agency (procurements ÷ 5) -1.259*** .451 -2.257*** .745 -2.113*** .781 
Maintenance of buildings .689 5.588 7.075 7.933 5.525 7.448 
Hotel/Restaurant -32.479*** 6.855 -31.648*** 9.359 -21.916** 10.572
Other personal services 5.277 6.858 25.399** 11.389 41.317*** 12.430
Refuse -19.550*** 6.801 -12.154 10.063 -8.458 9.708 
Miscellaneous services -14.714** 6.208 -15.927 8.658 -12.755 8.377 
No. of bidders     8.906*** 1.301 
      
Observations 515 368 368 
Notes: Savings are measured in thousands of euros on an annual basis. Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Unreported categories: Year 2012, maintenance of vehicles/apparatuses.












Ln(cost estimate)*SIZE and 
(ln(cost estimate))2*SIZE 









Full sample 1.00 (.03) [515] 1.01 (.03) [515] 1.03 (.04) [246] .99 (.03) [513] 
Subsample, excluding the 
quadratic function of the 
number of bidders 
1.01 (.03) [368] 1.03 (.03) [368] 1.02 (.04) [222] .99 (.03) [366] 
Subsample, including the 
quadratic function of the 
number of bidders 
.99 (.03) [368] 1.01 (.04) [368] 1.05 (.05) [222] .98 (.03) [366] 
Notes: Standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity are in parentheses, and the number of 
observations are in brackets. In columns 1, 2, and 4 the underlying estimations include the regressors in 
Table 4; in column 3, the underlying estimations include the regressors in Table 4 with the exception of 
the dummy variable for whether the contract will allow for extra payments. SIZE is the size of the 







TABLE 7—QML ESTIMATES OF SAVINGS, 2014-2015 ONLY. EXPONENTIAL 
REGRESSION ( 0  ). AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample Subsample Subsample 
Explanatory variable AME S.E. AME S.E. AME S.E. 
Cost estimate (€10,000s) 1.823*** .123 1.819*** .137 1.901*** .135 
Weight for price (÷ 10) 8.019*** 2.034 8.526*** 2.356 7.218*** 2.471 
Urgent -1.013 7.305 -1.054 8.423 -3.311 8.892 
Screening (weeks) .956 .635 1.074 .664 .570 .687 
Year 2015 8.770 5.967 9.719 6.466 8.026 6.504 
Size of agency (procurements ÷ 5) -2.040*** .753 -2.327*** .874 -2.422*** .909 
Maintenance of buildings 13.745 7.714 17.448 9.308 1.756 8.764 
Hotel/Restaurant -21.803** 9.820 -19.157 11.433 -13.957 13.314
Other personal services 35.596** 14.809 45.200*** 17.419 49.212** 19.922
Refuse -2.613 10.096 2.756 12.813 -11.680 9.490 
Miscellaneous services -15.521 9.997 -10.392 11.568 -12.731 10.603
No. of bidders     12.330*** 3.256 
      
Observations 246 222 222 
Notes: Savings are measured in thousands of euros on an annual basis. Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Unreported categories: Maintenance of vehicles/apparatuses. **
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FIGURE 2—EFFECT OF AN ADDITIONAL BIDDER ON SAVINGS, BY NUMBER OF 
BIDDERS 
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